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The Federal Reserve periodically makes decisions to reduce the rate of infla- 
tion. Romer and Romer (1989, also 1990), in a recent and influential study, 
identify six dates since World War  I1 when Federal Reserve policy became 
explicitly disinflationary. They have recently added a seventh date (Romer and 
Romer 1992).'  They find evidence of the effectiveness of Fed policy consistent 
with the predictions of  the neo-Keynesian model. The disinflations are fol- 
lowed by periods of substantial output and employment loss. 
Romer and Romer, in both their historical and econometric methodology, 
treat the changes in Fed policy as exogenous events. In their examination of 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) minutes, they look explicitly 
for innovations in Fed policy concerning the steady-state rate of inflation. They 
deliberately avoid an examination of  economic conditions in dating the Fed 
decisions. In their econometric work, they treat these changes in Fed policy as 
observed exogenous impulses that determine the course of real economic activ- 
ity and inflation. Hence, the impact of the policy shifts is estimated by ordinary 
least squares. The dynamic multipliers implied by  these estimates are thus 
taken as the impact per se of the policy. 
Matthew D. Shapiro is associate professor of  economics and faculty associate of the Survey 
Research Center at the University of Michigan and faculty research fellow of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
The author is grateful to Robert Barsky, Charles Fleischman, Lung-Fei Lee, Bennett McCallum, 
N.  Gregory Mankiw, David Rorner, anonymous reviewers, and the conference participants for 
helpful comments on preliminary drafts. Carlos Quintanilla provided able research assistance. This 
research was undertaken while he was an Alfred P.  Sloan Fellow. 
1. The dates identified in Romer and Romer (1989) are 1947:10, 1955:09, 1968:12, 1974:04, 
1978:08,  and 1979:lO.  Romer and Romer (1992) adds 1988:12. The preliminary research for this 
paper was carried out before the Romers identified this latest date. The estimates in this paper, 
however,  incorporate the new Romer date. Makadok (1988) also uses the narrative of  Federal 
Reserve policies to study their cause and effect. 
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Romer and Romer’s perspective of treating policy variables as exogenous is 
part of a long tradition. Most studies of  the effectiveness of monetary policy 
use time-series indicators of monetary policy such as growth rates of money 
stocks or interest rates as predictors of  aggregate economic outcomes. By 
ignoring the feedback of  the economy to policy, these studies treat policy 
changes as random shocks. 
But, of  course, decisions by  the FOMC to change policy take place with 
explicit consideration of economic conditions. A decision to disinflate is mean- 
ingful only if there is a precondition of existing high inflation, either actual or 
expected. Therefore, there must be feedback from the economy to policy mak- 
ing. Even if the Fed’s actions can be regarded as predetermined, they are cer- 
tainly not strictly exogenous. The FOMC is reacting to the economy and hop- 
ing to affect it. 
The first part of this paper examines the effects of  the Fed’s  decision to 
disinflate. That these decisions are followed by substantial declines in real ac- 
tivity is well documented in the Romers’ papers. Previous work does not, how- 
ever, examine the effect on inflation of the disinflationary shifts in policy. Since 
disinflation is the Fed’s explicit objective, I develop quantitative estimates of 
the disinflationary effect of the policy change in order to study systematically 
the decision to undertake it. 
The second part of  the paper uses what is learned about the effects of  a 
decision to disinflate to examine its determinants. It constructs measures of 
variables driving the Fed’s decision to disinflate. It then develops a discrete- 
choice model that shows how these variables explain the Fed’s actions. 
9.1  Effects 
In discussions of cause and effect, cause usually comes before effect. Yet, 
at least insofar as the empirical work for this paper is concerned, the effects of 
disinflation need to be studied first. Presumably, the Fed has an estimate of the 
impact of its policy before undertaking it. But in order to model that decision, 
I must first construct similar estimates of the costs and benefits of the decision. 
Surprisingly, the literature has not addressed the very basic question, what 
is the consequence  for injution of a decision by the Fed to disinflate? Empiri- 
cal work by Romer and Romer documents the costs of a decision to disinflate. 
They show forecasts of  production and unemployment responding to these 
Federal Reserve policy shifts. Taken for granted is that the disinflationary epi- 
sodes have a favorable impact on inflation, For the empirical modeling of the 
decision to disinflate, I need, however, a quantitative estimate of  the benefits 
as well as the costs. Therefore, I will examine in some detail the anti-inflation 
consequences of the disinflations. 309  Federal Reserve Policy: Cause and Effect 
9.1.1 
The variables I consider are inflation measured by the consumer price index, 
the civilian unemployment rate, and the Romer dummies.2 The goal of  this 
section is to develop forecasts of inflation and unemployment conditional on a 
policy change. These forecasts will then be used as an input into the model of 
Fed decisions in section 9.2. 
Since the aim of this section is to develop forecasts, it relies on simple time- 
series models of inflation and unemployment conditional on their own lags and 
lags of the Romer dummies. I present both univariate estimates and bivariate 
estimates, where lags of the unemployment rate appear in the inflation equa- 
tion and vice versa. 
Figure 9.1 presents the basic data. The unemployment rate has a clear and 
well-known upward trend for most of the sample. In the econometric work that 
follows, the unemployment rate is detrended with a linear trend. The trend 
arises because of labor-market phenomena not closely linked to short-run Fed 
policy, so abstracting from the trend seems appropriate. 
Specification of the inflation process is more problematic. As a matter of 
theory, it is desirable to allow for persistent impacts of the decision to disinflate 
on the level of inflation. Only finite lags of the Romer dates are entered into 
the equations. Hence, in an equation that has the level of inflation as the left- 
hand-side variable, a policy change will have only temporary, although pos- 
sibly very persistent, impacts on the inflation rate. In a specification where 
the difference of inflation is the dependent variable, they will in general have 
permanent effects, although the long-run effect could be small. 
Of course, the empirical persistence of the inflation process must be consid- 
ered. Previous work has found post-World  War I1 inflation, in contrast with 
earlier samples (see Barsky  1987), to be very persistent. The persistence of 
inflation is, however, very sensitive to the sample period. As we get more and 
more observations after the Volcker disinflation, inflation looks more mean- 
reverting. But even more important is how  the earlier years of  the postwar 
period are treated. The period 1947-52  has dramatic swings in inflation associ- 
ated with the post-World  War I1 and Korean War  business cycles and with 
price controls and their aftermath. Consequently, estimates in this paper are 
carried out over the period beginning in 1953. No claim is made that the results 
are robust to inclusion of the 1947-52  period. Quite the contrary, the results 
are very sensitive to inclusion of this period. Since there are strong a priori 
grounds for expecting the early period to be different from the later, including 
Specification of the Inflation Process 
2. The data are quarterly. The monthly Romer dummies are converted to quarterly as dummies 
for quarters during which a Romer date occurs. The inflation rate is measured as the three-month 
percent change (log-differences at annual rate) for the quarter. The unemployment rate is the aver- 
age for the quarter. The  sample period  is from  1953:l to  1992:4 (see below for discussion of 
sample period). The sample period refers to the range of the dependent variables in any equation 
estimated, so in those involving lags, the appropriate presample data are used. 310  Matthew D. Shapiro 
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Fig. 9.1 
Nore: Inflation is the four-quarter change in the consumer price index for all urban consumers. 
Unemployment is the civilian unemployment rate. Vertical lines are the Romer dates. 
Inflation, unemployment and the decision to disinflate 
it in the sample would not shed much light on the behavior of the economy 
during the bulk of the postwar period. 
Table 9.1 documents this sensitivity of the inflation process to the sample 
period. It reports the regression results of the change of  inflation on seven of 
its own lags and the lagged level. The table reports the implied largest autore- 
gressive root of  the level of inflation and its t-statistic for the null that it is 
unity.  Both these statistics have Dickey-Fuller (198 1) distributions. The first 
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Fig. 9.2  Response of unemployment and inflation to a Romer date: inflation 
nonstationary 
Note: Estimates from (a) table 9.2 and (b) table 9.4. 
inflation process in the early period. For both the 1947-92  and 1947-79  peri- 
ods, inflation is estimated to be rapidly mean-reverting (largest roots of 0.68 
or 0.66). But the next rows show that much of  the mean-reversion over the 
postwar period arises from the 1947-52  period. This period had very unpersis- 
tent inflation (root of 0.19). On account of this very different behavior, together 
with the Korean War price controls, I start the sample in 1953. 
In  the 1953-92  period, inflation is just on the boundary between accepting 312  Matthew D. Shapiro 
Table 9.1  Persistence of Inflation: Various Samples since 1947 
Largest 
Autoregressive 
Sample  Root  t-statistic 
1947: 1-199214  0.68  -4.96 
1947: 1-1979:4  0.66  -4.10 
1947:  1-19524  0.19  -2.92 
1953: 1-1992:4  0.84  -2.97 
1953: 1-1979:4  0.92  -  1.26 
Note: Table reports Dickey-Fuller (1981) regression of  the change of inflation (seven lags) and a 
constant (no trend). It reports the implied largest autoregressive root of the level of  inflation and 
the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic for the null hypothesis that it is unity. 
and rejecting the unit-root hypothesis. The largest autoregressive root is 0.84; 
the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic of  -2.97  is marginal at conventional significance 
levels. The last row shows that even in the 1953-92 period, there are important 
changes in the persistence of inflation. In the 1953-79  period, the root is much 
closer to unity and the t-statistic is in the region of  nonrejection. Inflation 
looked very persistent over this period. Since the Volcker disinflation of  the 
1980s, it looks more mean-reverting. As I will argue later in this section, the 
Volcker disinflation is a singular event, so it is hard to predict its lasting conse- 
quences for the process of inflation. 
In light of the sensitivity of the inflation process to specification and sample 
period, many of  the results of this paper will be presented for specifications 
using both the level and difference of  inflation. It is already clear from table 
9.1 that certain results, those concerning inflation, will be sensitive to the spec- 
ification of its process. But other results, in particular those relating to unem- 
ployment, are not. 
9.1.2  Results: Effects of Policy Changes 
estimate what happens after a Romer date are specified as follows: 
Let T,  be the inflation rate and u, be the employment rate. The equations to 
where AT, is the change of the inflation rate, R, is the dummy variable that is 
one on a Romer date and zero otherwise, and A(L) and D(L)  are polynomials 
in the lag operator. The A(L) polynomials are eighth-order and ~nrestricted.~ 
The D(L)  polynomials, which capture the impact of the Romer dates, include 
lags one through sixteen and are estimated as fourth-order polynomially dis- 
3. The A"&)  polynomial also is such that the current value T,  of the inflation rate is included 
in the equation for unemployment. This is merely a normalization to make the error terms uncorre- 
lated. It is equivalent to using the triangularization popular in the literature on vector autoregres- 
sions. 313  Federal Reserve Policy: Cause and Effect 
tributed lags with the far endpoint restricted to zero.4 When estimated as un- 
restricted, the lag distributions are noisier, but have  basically the same dy- 
namics. 
The coefficients f3 are constrained to be zero in the nonstationary specifica- 
tion of inflation and freely estimated when inflation is allowed to be stationary. 
Including the lagged level of inflation in the equations is equivalent to respeci- 
fying the equations in terms of the level of inflation. This normalization facili- 
tates comparison of the estimated coefficients across the specifications of the 
inflation proces~.~ 
Univariate Estimates 
The results for the univariate estimates are presented in table 9.2 and 9.3 
and figures 9.2a and 9.3a. Consider first the estimates for unemployment (the 
same in both tables).6  Unemployment has the hump-shaped dynamics that are 
typical of real aggregates. After a shock to unemployment, it continues in the 
same direction for several quarters before slowly reverting to trend. The Romer 
dates increase unemployment gradually. Figure 9.2a shows the convolution of 
the Romer dates and the own-lags of unemployment. Following a Romer date, 
unemployment gradually increases to a peak level of 1.73 in the fifteenth quar- 
ter after the shocks and then slowly reverts to trend. As  subsequent figures 
show, these dynamics are essentially invariant to the specification of the infla- 
tion rate and to whether a univariate or bivariate system is estimated. They 
replicate the findings presented by Romer and Romer (1989). The tables give 
the F-statistic for the null hypothesis that the all of  the coefficients of  the 
Romer dates are zero.7 For unemployment, this hypothesis is rejected at the 
0.03 level. 
The constant of the unemployment rate equation has an interesting interpre- 
tation. Since the variable u, is zero mean, it would be zero but for the inclusion 
of the dummies for disinflation. The estimated coefficient indicates that the 
Romer dates increase the average unemployment rate by  about one-tenth of 
one percentage point. 
Now consider the estimates of the inflation process. Even conditioning on 
the Romer dates, inflation is persistent. The coefficient of the lagged level of 
inflation in table 9.3 is not significantly different from zero. Hence, inclusion 
of  the Romer dummies does not affect the unit-roots tests reported in  table 
9.1. Inflation is, however, less persistent than a random walk (see the negative 
coefficients of  the lagged AT).  The coefficients of  the lagged Romer dates 
4.  Sixteen lags is long enough so that the endpoint restriction is not strongly binding. 
5. To  make the nonstationary and stationary models have the same degrees of freedom, when 
inflation is allowed to he stationary by  including the lagged level T,-,,  I include only seven lags 
in the polynomials in AT(-,. 
6.  Recall that here and throughout, u,  is the deviation of unemployment from a linear trend. 
7. Because the lags of the Romer dates are  estimated as a fourth-order polynomial with a far 
endpoint constraint, the hypothesis has only three restrictions. 314  Matthew D. Shapiro 
Table 9.2  Estimated Response of Inflation and Unemployment (inflation 
nonstationary,  univariate estimates) 
Independent 
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Nore: Autoregression of change of  inflation (AT)  and detrended unemployment (u)  on own lags 
and Romer dates (R). Standard errors are in parentheses. S.E.E. is standard error of regression. R2 
is adjusted coefficient of  determination. F(3,140) and p-value  are the F-statistic  and rejection 
probability for the hypothesis that the coefficients of R are jointly zero. 315  Federal Reserve Policy: Cause and Effect 
Table 9.3  Estimated Response of Inflation and Unemployment  (Inflation 
stationary, univariate estimates) 
Independent 



















































































































































































Note: Autoregression of  change of inflation (Am) and detrended unemployment (u) on own lags 
and Romer dates (R). Lagged level of  inflation included to render inflation stationary. See also 
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Note:  Estimates from (a) table 9.3 and (b) table 9.5. 
Response of unemployment and inflation to a Romer date: inflation 
have similar patterns in table 9.2 and table 9.3. Following a Romer date, infla- 
tion continues to accelerate for two quarters and then decelerates. The joint 
test that the coefficients of the Romer dates are all zero rejects for the nonsta- 
tionary, but not for the stationary specification. 
The dynamic response of  inflation to the Romer dates is again easiest to 
see in the figures. Figure 9.2a gives the response for the univariate, inflation- 
nonstationary model; figure 9.3a gives it for the univariate, inflation-stationary 317  Federal Reserve Policy: Cause and Effect 
model. Both figures report the response of the level of inflation to a Romer 
date. For the nonstationary specification in figure 9.2a, inflation continues to 
accelerate for several quarters. It then decelerates until it levels off after about 
four years at a level five percentage points lower than where it began. This 
change is economically significant. The standard error of the inflation equation 
is about two percentage points, so the reduction is two and one-half times the 
innovation’s standard error. But as will be shown below, the magnitude of the 
change is attributable largely to the Volcker disinflation. 
The pattern for the stationary-inflation model in figure 9.3a is similar, al- 
though the magnitudes are not. The maximum reduction in inflation is only 
about three percentage points, and, of course, it is temporary. Moreover, recall 
that the coefficients of  the Romer dates are not significantly different from 
zero in the estimates reported in table 9.3, so the projected disinflation is not 
statistically significant. 
Multivariate Estimates 
Table 9.4 and 9.5 and figures 9.2b and 9.3b report the results of estimating 
the multivariate model where the change in inflation and the level of  unem- 
ployment are regressed on their own lags and lags of the unemployment rate.* 
Both nonstationary- and stationary-inflation models are again estimated. 
Figures 9.2b and 9.3b report the total responses to a Romer date. That is, for 
inflation, the changes in lagged unemployment are taken into account and vice 
versa. The estimated response of unemployment and inflation to disinflations 
is very similar to the corresponding estimates for the univariate models in the 
(a) panels of the figures. The similarity of the univariate and multivariate esti- 
mates of the response of inflation and unemployment to a disinflation disguises 
interesting differences that are revealed in the estimates of the equations re- 
ported  in the tables. In the unemployment  equation, the coefficients of  the 
Romer  dates  do not  change much  between  tables  9.2 and  9.4.  Including 
the lagged changes in inflation only slightly attenuates the coefficients of  the 
Romer dates in the unemployment equation in table 9.4. They remain statisti- 
cally significant, although at the 0.06 rather than the 0.03 level. 
On the other hand, when lags of unemployment are included in the equation 
for the change in inflation in table 9.4, the coefficients of the Romer dates get 
considerably smaller than those in the univariate model in table 9.2. Moreover, 
the coefficients of the Romer dates in the inflation equation in table 9.4 are 
jointly statistically insignificant (p-value of the F-statistic is 0.5 1). Hence, the 
impact on inflation of the Romer dates in the multivariate system operates indi- 
rectly through the impact of lagged unemployment rather than directly in the 
inflation equation. Since the estimated equations are reduced form, they need 
to be interpreted with caution. Yet, the absence of an independent impact of 
8. Also, the current change in inflation is included in the unemployment rate regression to nor- 
malize the residuals to  be uncorrelated. 318  Matthew D. Shapiro 
Table 9.4  Estimated Response of Inflation and Unemployment (inflation 
nonstationary,  multivariate estimates) 
Independent 
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Note: Vector autoregression of change of inflation (AT) and detrended unemployment (u)  on own 
lags and Romer dates (R).  Current AT included in equation for u to triangularize the system. See 
also note to table 9.2. 319  Federal Reserve Policy: Cause and Effect 
Table 9.5  Estimated Response of Inflation and Unemployment  (inflation 
stationary, multivariate estimates) 
Independent 























































































































































































































Note:  Vector autoregression of change of inflation (AT)  and detrended unemployment (u)  on  own 
lags and Romer dates (R). Lagged level of inflation included to render inflation stationary. Current 
AT included in equation for u to triangularize the system. See also note to table 9.2. 320  Matthew D. Shapiro 
the Romer dates on inflation does suggest that disinflations operate through 
the Phillips curve rather than by independent shifts in the inflationary regime. 
Including the lagged unemployment rates in the equation for inflation in the 
stationary specification has a similar effect (compare tables 9.3 and 9.5). The 
coefficients of the Romer dates in the inflation equation in table 9.5 are sub- 
stantially smaller than those in table 9.3. But they are insignificant in both the 
univariate and multivariate equations, so the difference in the magnitudes of 
the coefficient estimates should not be overinterpreted. 
Disinjlations Episode by Episode 
In  the inflation-nonstationary  specification, the estimates  reported in this 
section imply that the disinflations have, on average, a substantial, permanent 
effect on the inflation rate. These come at a cost of high unemployment for a 
period of  years. But as Feldstein  (1979) points out, a permanent  gain from 
lower inflation could well outweigh the temporary output loss. 
The estimates based on the regressions for the whole period have important 
limitations. Specifically, they impose that the magnitude of the disinflation is 
the same across episodes.'  It could well be that certain episodes represented 
much more substantial contractions than others. In this subsection, I present 
evidence that reveals what success the Fed had in reducing the rate of inflation 
following each Romer date. 
To examine the impact of the disinflations episodically, I use the following 
simple, nonparametric procedure. I estimate a univariate autoregression of the 
change of inflation over the entire sample. The equation includes a constant 
and eight lags of AT,, but no Romer dummies. Figure 9.4 shows graphs of the 
cumulative forecast error for the level of inflation from the quarter before each 
Romer date.Io The solid lines are the forecast errors, the dashed lines are the 
one-standard-deviation  error bands. For example, in figure 9.4c, inflation is 
almost 8 percent lower in 1976:  1, eight quarters after the Romer date, than it 
was forecast to be in 1974:1, the quarter before the decision to disinflate. 
Figure 9.4 shows that, except for the October  1979 Volcker disinflation, 
none of the decisions to disinflate had a permanent impact on the level of infla- 
tion. (Figure 9.4d credits the August 1978 disinflation with a long-run impact, 
but the forecast errors do not turn negative until after the October 1979 date.) 
Forecast errors after the September 1955 (figure 9.4a) episode were large and 
positive.  After  the  December  1968 (figure  9.4b) episode,  the  errors  were 
small-first  positive and then negative. In the disinflation following the first 
OPEC price increase (figure 9.4c), there were persistent and large negative 
forecast errors. Over the two-year horizon, there were substantial reductions in 
the realized rate of inflation relative to expectation, but these begin to dissipate 
in 1976. By early 1978 (note that this date is before the second OPEC oil price 
9. I am grateful to Saul Hymaus and Phil Howrey for stressing this issue to me. 
10. Romer and Romer (1989, figure 3)  provide an analogous figure for the unemployment rate. 321  Federal Reserve Policy: Cause and Effect 
increase), inflation is close to its predisinflation expected value. Hence, if this 
episode is to be counted as a success, there must be some offsetting failure 
subsequent to it. Moreover, the failure of the OPEC I disinflation to have last- 
ing benefits cannot be blamed on OPEC 11. Any success had dissipated before 
the second oil shock. 
Figure 9.4d tells the story of the August 1978 disinflation. It totally failed 
to affect the forecast errors. They remain positive in the first six quarters. The 
subsequent reductions in inflation occurred after the 1979 episode. 
The October  1979 episode is the outstanding success. It  heralded a sus- 
tained, large reduction in the rate of  inflation. Five years after it, the rate of 
inflation was 8.5 percentage points lower than would have been forecast in the 
quarter before the decision to disinflate. From figure 9.4, it is clear that this 
data point is virtually alone in driving the estimates of the long-run effect of 
the Romer dummies on inflation presented in the previous subsections. 
Finally, figure 9.4f reports the effect of the most recent episode, After bounc- 
ing around for several years, the forecast error does settle down below zero, 
but it is well within the one-standard-deviation band. 
Discussion 
The large estimated response of the inflation rate to the decision to disinflate 
is driven by  the success of the Volcker disinflation. Following the 1955, 1968, 
1978, and 1988 decisions, forecast errors for inflation were positive or mixed. 
The 1974 episode was a temporary success, but inflation reasserted itself even 
before the second round of  OPEC price increases. Perhaps it should not be 
surprising that  the  Volcker episode looks uniquely  successful. Figure 9.1  a 
shows how inflation continued to rise after each disinflation, even if there was 
a temporary retreat. Moreover, had the previous episodes been successful, the 
conditions that fostered the Volcker change in  policy would  not have  been 
present. 
These results do not necessarily imply, however, that the future rate of infla- 
tion is not a primary variable of  concern in motivating the Fed to disinflate. 
The Fed could act in the hope of having a success along the lines that Volcker 
did, even if in most cases these hopes are not realized. This issue of how the 
Fed reacts to inflation is addressed in the next section. 
9.2  Cause 
This section attempts to model the decision of the Fed to disinflate. In it I 
first calculate measures of the costs and benefits of the decision to disinflate. 
The estimates of the previous section are inputs into these calculations. I then 
estimate a discrete-choice model of  the decision to disinflate based on these 
measures of costs and benefits. 
The structure of the model is as follows. Let R; be the Fed’s intolerance of 
inflation. This is an unobserved. continuous variable. When it exceeds a thresh- 322  Matthew D. Shapiro 
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Fig. 9.4  Forecast error for inflation following decisions to disinflate 
Note; Cumulative forecast errors of the level of inflation estimated on an AR(8) model for AT,. 
Dashed line is one-standard-deviation error band. 
old (normalized to be zero), the Fed decides it is worthwhile to subject the 
economy to a disinflation.  The structure of the econometric specification  paral- 
lels that of the discrete-choice literature. The latent intolerance to inflation is 
modeled as a linear function of observables,  X,: 
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When the intolerance exceeds the threshold, the Fed decides to change policy. 
That is, 
(3)  R, = 1 when Rr* > 0. 
In this section, I first consider the variables that determine the decision to disin- 
flate (XJ.  Then I use those variables to estimate the discrete-choice model. 324  Matthew D. Shapiro 
9.2.1  Variables Determining the Decision to Disinflate 
This section of the paper develops variables that are meant to explain the 
Fed’s decision to disinflate. The obvious candidates are measures relating to 
unemployment (the cost of  disinflation) and inflation  (the potential benefit). 
In periods of  high inflation, the Fed should more likely be contemplating a 
disinflation. In periods of high expected unemployment, the cost of disinflating 
is higher, so the Fed is less likely to make the economy suffer from a disin- 
flation. 
One approach would be to make the determining variables X, simply lags of 
the unemployment and inflation. But such a model would be misspecified on 
several grounds. First, presumably what the Fed is contemplating is the impact 
of its decision on future economic outcomes. Hence, the variables should be 
forward looking, although they should not use future information. 
Second, inflation and unemployment are inertial. The quarter after a deci- 
sion to disinflate, they will be about the same as they were when the decision 
was made. If the X,  were based on the current values of unemployment and 
inflation, equations  (2)  and (3) would continue to predict changes in policy 
even after they had taken place. To avoid this misspecification, the variables X, 
must ratchet as a consequence of a previous decision to disinflate. Again, this 
can be accomplished by making them forward looking. Forecasts of unemploy- 
ment and inflation can react  instantaneously even if the actual variables  are 
sluggish. 
Several other considerations about the specifications of X,  are driven by  the 
fact that there are only a few episodes of policy change. The list of variables 
must be short. With an unparsimonious specification and only six disinflations 
in the sample, it would  be very easy to overfit the model. Moreover, again 
because of the small number of episodes, there is little scope to let the data 
guide the choice of variables without running the risk that all fit is spurious. 
With these considerations in mind, I use the following two measures as de- 
terminants of Federal Reserve decisions to disinflate. They are the expected 
present discounted value of  the level of inflation and the expected present dis- 
counted value of  unemployment. 
These variables capture what one hopes are the central concerns of the Fed 
when it contemplates a change in aggregate policy. They are forward looking 
but based on current information and they summarize parsimoniously the cur- 
rent outlook conditional on whether a disinflation has recently occurred. More- 
over, they are highly correlated with other variables that might be considered 
as candidates for driving the Fed’s decision. I will discuss below the robustness 
of the posited measures to various changes in the specification. 
These variables are calculated using the estimates developed in section 9.1. 
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the sample. The summary measures are calculated based on these forecasts. I 
then calculate their expected present discounted value using a 2 percent per 
quarter discount rate. The robustness of  the measures to the discount rate is 
also considered below. 
Note that the present value of the inflation rate might be a key determinant 
of  the decision to disinflate despite the limited effect of the disinflations on 
inflation in most episodes. The Fed might react to the inflation rate even if it 
turns out it does not, in practice, succeed in changing it. 
Estimates of  the Present Discounted Value of  Forecasted InJation and 
Unemployment 
Figure 9.5 gives the estimated determinants of the decision to disinflate. The 
estimates are based on the multivariate system presented in table 9.4." They 
are normalized by multiplying by one minus the discount rate so that the units 
are roughly at annual rate. In this section of the paper, only estimates based on 
the nonstationary inflation model will be presented. In the next subsection, I 
show that the present discounted value of forecast inflation is not that sensitive 
to the stationarity versus nonstationarity of inflation. 
Figure 9.5a graphs the present discounted value of the forecasted inflation 
rate. Its low frequency movements track the actual inflation rate. The variable 
does ratchet down after Romer dates, but there are also fairly large changes 
not associated with Romer dates. Recall that the permanent effect of a Romer 
date is only two and one-half times the standard deviations of  the inflation 
innovation, so large swings independent of the Romer dates are to be expected. 
The present discounted value of expected unemployment is given in figure 
9.5b. It falls steadily until a Romer date is encountered and then ratchets up 
once the disinflation occurs. Unlike inflation, the Romer dates appear to be the 
predominate factor in unemployment's business-cycle movements. 
Robustness 
As noted above, there is little scope for experimentation with the variables 
to be included in the model for estimating the probability of disinflation. Yet 
there is also little theoretical guidance as to the precise form of these variables. 
Therefore, one should be concerned whether the measures of the variables 
driving the Fed's decisions are robust to plausible perturbations of their speci- 
fication. In this subsection, I consider how various alternative measures corre- 
late with the ones used in the probit estimates. 
A plausible alternative measure of the inflation rate would be the long-run 
or asymptotic forecast of  its level.12 This measure is very highly correlated 
11. The equation for unemployment does not include the current change in inflation when it is 
used in this section. 
12. Earlier drafts of this paper used this measure. 326  Matthew D. Shapiro 
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Fig. 9.5  Variables determining the Fed’s decision to disinflate 
Note: Present discounted value (discount rate of 2 percent per quarter) of forecasted inflation 
and unemployment. Estimates based on multivariate forecasts with inflation nonstationary (see 
text). Vertical lines are Romer dates. 327  Federal Reserve Policy: Cause and Effect 
Table 9.6  Decision to Disinflate: Probit Estimates 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant  -4.04  -1.92  -4.24 
(0.82)  (0.23)  (0.89) 
PDV inflation  0.35  0.36 
(0.11)  (0.12) 
PDV unemployment  -  1.62  -1.61 
(0.92)  (0.99) 
Log likelihood  -  19.98  -23.69  -18.29 
Note:  Probit estimates using values of the expected present discounted value (PDV) of  inflation 
and unemployment as explanatory variables for Fed decisions to disinflate. See text for details. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
with the one used in the present paper. Indeed, the correlation is 0.987, so the 
measures are roughly interchangeable. 
In section 9.1, very different results were obtained for the stationary versus 
nonstationary specifications of the inflation rate. Two factors militate against 
there being much of a difference between these specifications for calculating 
present discounted values. First, the pattern of  the change for the first four 
years is about the same. Second, discounting makes the differences in the dis- 
tant years not matter much. Consequently, the correlation between the present 
discounted value of expected inflation for inflation-stationary and nonstation- 
ary is 0.986 for the discount rate of 0.02 per quarter.I3 
Finally,  over  plausible  ranges  of  discount  rates,  the  expected  present 
discounted values remain highly coherent. This paper uses a 0.02 quarterly 
discount rate in calculating the expected present discounted value of inflation 
and unemployment. Compare these to those calculated with an extremely high 
discount rate, say 0.10 per quarter: the correlation of  the inflation measure 
discounted with 0.02 versus 0.10 is 0.965; for unemployment, it is 0.964. 
9.2.2  Estimated Probability of Disinflation 
The models in equations (2) and (3) are estimated using a probit specifica- 
tion of the disturbance. The explanatory variables are the lagged values of the 
expected present discounted value of inflation and unemp10yment.I~  (See table 
9.6.) Model 1 uses just the inflation variable, model 2 uses just the unemploy- 
ment variable, model 3 uses both. Expected inflation has the predicted impact 
on the decision to disinflate. Higher inflation raises the probability. The coeffi- 
cient is strongly statistically significant. Likewise, expected unemployment 
13. This calculation should be taken with a grain of  salt, however, because of  the statistical 
insignificance of the Romer dates in the stationary specification of  inflation. For this reason, I 
focus on the inflation nonstationary model. 
14. Makadok (1988) estimates a multinominal model (for expansionary, neutral, and contrac- 
tionary policy) based on lagged macroeconomic variables. 328  Matthew D. Shapiro 
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Fig. 9.6  Estimated probability of disinflation 
Note; Estimates based on equation reported in table 9.6, model 1. Vertical lines are Romer dates. 
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Fig. 9.7  Estimated probability of disinflation 
Note; Estimates based on equation reported in table 9.6, model 2. Vertical lines are Romer dates. 
also has the predicted impact. Lower unemployment raises the probability  of 
disinflation, but the estimate is only marginally statistically significant. Includ- 
ing both variables does not much alter the magnitude of the estimated coeffi- 
cients, indicating that they have an independent impact on the probability  of 
a disinflation. 















1957  1961  1965  1969  1973  1977  1981  1985  1989 
Fig. 9.8  Estimated probability of disinflation 
Now  Estimates based on equation reported in table 9.6, model 3. Vertical lines are Romer dates. 
through 9.8 give the implied probability of  disinflation period by  period for 
the three models. Except for the first disinflation, which this specification to- 
tally fails to predict, the probabilities have local peaks around the Romer dates. 
For the models including inflation, for just one date-the  1974 disinflation- 
does the probability of  a disinflation exceed one-half. Hence the model does 
not do a good job of pinpointing the particular quarter when the disinflation 
will take place. But the probability is high over adjacent quarters, so the model 
does attribute a high probability to a disinflation taking place in the year that 
they occur.'5 
Given the low t-statistic of  the unemployment variable in the estimates, it 
does not do a good job of tracking the decisions. Yet figure 9.7 illustrates the 
role it has in explaining disinflation. The probability slowly increases as unem- 
ployment falls prior to a Romer date. Since unemployment is so persistent, the 
variable does little to pinpoint that particular quarter of the disinflation. Hence 
the low t-statistic. Yet, the integral of the probability over the quarters leading 
up to the disinflation would indicate the strong probability of  a disinflation 
sometime during the period of low unemployment. 
Consider the episodes in turn. As has already been noted, the 1955 episode 
is not explained by the model. Neither was unemployment expected to be par- 
ticularly low nor inflation particularly high. 
15. Recall that the disinflations are rare. In a sample of  180 quarters, only seven occur. Hence, 
the unconditional probability of  one occumng in  any given quarter is less than 4  percent. The 
fitted probabilities should thus be judged against this baseline, not a baseline developed for cross- 
section studies where the number of  zeros and ones in the explanatory variable are of  the same 
order of  magnitude. 330  Matthew D. Shapiro 
The probability of disinflation grew steadily in the late 1960s until the 1969 
episode. Comparing figures 9.6 and 9.7, this fitted probability is mainly associ- 
ated with the unemployment variable. 
The 1974 decision is the one most sharply predicted by the model. It com- 
bined the maximum expected inflation with fairly low expected unemployment 
(see figure 9.7). 
The next two best-predicted decisions are in the late 1970s. Inflation is the 
driving factor. Indeed, once unemployment is taken into account, the Volcker 
disinflation in  1979 has a lower fitted probability than when only inflation is 
included in the model (compare figures 9.6 and 9.8). Why is the most success- 
ful disinflation not the most likely? It is precisely because expected unemploy- 
ment was fairly high in late  1979, partially as a consequence of  the failed 
disinflation of the previous year. 
Finally, Romer and Romer (1992) have dated a seventh post-World  War I1 
disinflation in late 1988. The model concurs. It begins to predict a disinflation 
in 1987 based on the drift downward in the unemployment rate beginning in 
the mid-1980s. As with the 1969 episode, low unemployment rather than high 
inflation is the primary explanatory factor.I6 
Figure 9.9 presents estimates of a model that is intentionally misspecijied. It 
uses estimates of the expected present discounted value of inflation and unem- 
ployment as explanatory variables in the probit that are based on a vector auto- 
regression and that do not include the Romer dates as explanatory variables. 
These results illustrate the importance of  allowing the forcing variables to 
ratchet down after a Romer date. Because inflation and unemployment are per- 
sistent, the predictions using these forecasts tend to lag the events. The mis- 
specified model continues to predict disinflations well after they  have  hap- 
pened. 
But perhaps more importantly, the results in figure 9.9 provide some evi- 
dence that the results in the previous figures are not rigged by virtue of includ- 
ing the Romer date dummies as lagged variables in constructing the explana- 
tory variables for the probits. The fitted probabilities indeed do rise in the 
quarters before the Romer dates with much the same pattern as in figure 9.8. 
An exception is the 1979 episode, which is better fit by the model reported in 
figure 9.9. With this model, the cost of  the disinflation is not being affected by 
the response of forecasted unemployment to the 1978 episode. 
9.3  Summary 
This paper examines the Fed’s decision to disinflate. It focuses on the role 
of pre-existing economic conditions in the decisions. It finds that these deci- 
16. As a test of  the specification and to further evaluate the new Romer date, I estimated the 
probit using data fit only through 1985 and then estimates the probabilities for the 1986-92  period. 
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Fig. 9.9  Estimated probability of disinflation 
Note: Estimates based on expected present value of inflation and unemployment, but not 
conditioning on Romer dates. This model is intentional misspecified (see text). Vertical lines are 
Romer dates. 
sions are driven both by  the prevailing unemployment and inflation rates. Even 
in periods of high inflation, the Fed will be relatively unwilling to disinflate if 
the rate of  unemployment is otherwise expected to be high. Similarly, espe- 
cially for the 1969 and  1988 episodes, low unemployment rather than high 
inflation seems to explain the Fed’s action. 
In planning this paper, I expected estimating the inflation process to be 
merely a side issue. But the analysis of the inflation process proves very inter- 
esting in itself. While on average the “disinflations” do reduce the rate of  infla- 
tion subsequently, this average result is driven almost entirely by  the  1979 
episode. This leads one to ask, what is the Fed accomplishing by  putting the 
economy into a recession? Perhaps it is responding to incipient inflation that 
is signaled by low unemployment. These could arise through nonlinearities in 
the Phillips curve not captured in simple specifications. Indeed, perhaps we do 
not see that region of the Phillips curve because the Fed never lets unemploy- 
ment get so low. In any case, the economics profession’s recent view that the 
Fed has had great success in reducing the rate of inflation, albeit with a tempo- 
rary output loss, is largely colored by the achievement of the Volcker disinfla- 
tion. Over the post-World  War I1 period, the average disinflationary episode 
has done little to reduce the rate of  inflation despite clear evidence that the 
changes in policy do cause unemployment to rise substantially. 332  Matthew D. Shapiro 
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Comment  Bennett T. McCallum 
Matthew Shapiro has conducted a careful and interesting re-examination of 
the effects of U.S. unemployment of  the Romer and Romer (1989) dummy 
variable, which was designed to reflect postwar decisions by the Fed to disin- 
flate. In particular, Shapiro’s analysis recognizes the dependence of such deci- 
sions on the state of the economy-in  other words, of their endogeneity. In the 
process of conducting his study, he has made a commendable effort to deter- 
mine whether his results are robust with respect to the sample period utilized 
and to the maintained hypothesis regarding stationarity of the inflation process. 
Regarding the former, I would tend a priori to prefer the results based on the 
sample beginning in 1953, since there were various administrative controls in 
effect during the Korean War, enough to suggest that market responses would 
be affected. And as for the stationarity assumption, it is fortunately the case 
that most of his results are not sensitive to the assumption adopted. 
One issue that Shapiro did not consider concerns the effect of including oil 
price shocks as an additional explanatory variable. This issue has been raised 
in a pair of recent papers, by  Hoover and Perez (1992) and Dotsey and Reid 
(1992), which suggest that the Romer and Romer (R&R) dummy loses its sig- 
nificance’ when oil price shocks are included in the regression equation. In a 
recent  working paper, Romer and Romer (1992) responded  to the Hoover- 
Perez contention by  demonstrating that their policy  dummy retains  signifi- 
Bennett T.  McCallum is the H. J. Heinz Professor of Economics at Carnegie Mellon University 
1. In this Comment, all references to “statistical significance” will be understood to apply to a 
and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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cance in three out of four specifications considered, although by a small mar- 
gin when the sample period used in their original study is utilized.* This work- 
ing  paper  does  not  respond  explicitly  to  the  Dotsey-Reid  claim  that  the 
dummy’s effect is insignificant when oil price shocks are entered with separate 
coefficients for positive and negative changes. One possible reason for the dis- 
crepancy relative to the Romer and Romer (1992) results is that Dotsey and 
Reid  (1992) include only  twenty-four  lagged values of  the policy  dummy, 
rather than thirty-six. A more likely reason, however, is that the Dotsey-Reid 
test pertains to the joint insignificance of  all lagged values of  the dummy, 
whereas Romer and Romer look at the (cumulative) effect as depicted by the 
impulse response function. In this regard, I would share the Romers’ belief that 
the latter is more appropriate-a  point that is relevant to the discussion below. 
My main reservation concerning Shapiro’s study pertains to its motivation, 
that is, to his reasons for devoting valuable time, energy, and ingenuity to im- 
proving upon existing estimates of the effects of the R&R dummy variable on 
unemployment-and,  in his  study, inflation. This reservation  might be ex- 
pressed  as follows. In  work conducted prior  to that  of  Romer and  Romer 
(1989), it  was  customary  to  use  variables  such as  money-growth  rates  or 
interest-rate changes to measure monetary policy actions in regressions  ex- 
plaining macroeconomic phenomena such as inflation, output growth, or what- 
ever.’ Then Romer and Romer suggested the use of their disinflation dummy, 
with dates for its “on” values based on their reading of the Fed’s “Record of 
Policy Action,” and emphasized a motivation expressed largely4 in  terms of 
the putative exogeneity of this measure. But Shapiro has correctly recognized 
that this dummy is not plausibly  exogenous,  so the question that naturally 
arises is, what are  its actual differences in comparison  with the traditional 
measures? In response, one has to recognize that the traditional measures are 
variables that can range over a near-continuum of values, rather than assuming 
only one of two values, and can therefore distinguish between major and minor 
policy  action^.^ A second difference is that the R&R dummy recognizes as 
“nonzero” actions only those in a contractionary direction-decisions  to be 
more expansionary  are lumped together with normal policy behavior. And, 
2. That period is 1948.2 or 1950.2 through 1987.12; Romer and Romer (1992) also extend the 
period through  1991.12, in  which case an  additional disinflation (dated December  1988) is in- 
cluded. 
3. This statement does not pertain to studies based on vector autoregression (VAR) systems, in 
which all fluctuations are attributed to the innovation or “surprise” component of one of  the sys- 
tem’s variables. Except in cases in which it is presumed that only surprise components are im- 
portant, which was not the presumption of Romer and Romer (1989), the VAR-type attribution 
seems less appropriate for answering questions of the type, Does monetary policy matter? A recent 
study that includes the R&R dummy in a VAR context is Leeper (1993). 
4.  But not exclusively. 
5. In this regard, Shapiro’s finding that inflation appears not to respond to disinflation decisions 
(except in the Volcker case) may be a manifestation of the inadequacy of the 0-1  dummy as com- 
pared with a measure reflecting different degrees of intensity. The Volcker disinflation was, I think 
most observers would agree, a larger and more sustained action than the others in the sample. 334  Matthew D. Shapiro 
third, values of the R&R dummy are based on what it is that the members of 
the Federal Open Market  Committee say, not  on what it  is that  the Open- 
Market desk actually does. Since the dummy is not exogenous, these seem to 
me to be the main differences-that  the R&R dummy reflects changes in only 
one direction, does not reflect the intensity of policy actions, and is based on 
statements  rather  than actions.  Thus one is led  to wonder  how  use of  this 
dummy, instead of a traditional measure, constitutes an improvement over pre- 
vious practice. My tentative view would be that it does not. 
But use of the disinflation policy dummy was not the only novelty of the 
Romer and Romer (1989) study. Also unusual  was  the decision to include 
many6 lagged values of the policy variable and to retain them, even when virtu- 
ally all are individually insignificant in terms of explanatory power, while fo- 
cusing attention on the impulse response function that measures the cumulative 
effect of the policy variable. This aspect of the Romers’ approach is conceptu- 
ally distinct from their use of the policy dummy, and strikes this reviewer as 
the more important contribution. Be that as it may, this part of the Romer and 
Romer strategy would evidently be just as appropriate in combination with one 
of the traditional policy measures as it is with the R&R dummy.’ 
Similarly, any reservations that one might have about the merits of the R&R 
dummy do not negate the value of Shapiro’s procedure,  which involves con- 
struction of an instrumental variable based on predetermined  determinants of 
policy actions. This procedure for taking account of the endogeneity of policy 
responses should be applicable whether the researcher is using a dummy vari- 
able or a more conventional measure of policy actions. 
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6.  Thirty-six, in regressions with monthly data. 
7. In  addition, the move away from emphasis on VAR  innovations seems desirable (as men- 
tioned above). 